
Smart Contract Security

Certora Blog
Technical research and practical perspectives for financial institutions, regulators and builders.
Selected by the Certora team

Formal Verification
AI coding agents are changing how software is developed, but reviewing their output remains a bottleneck. This article explores why engineering teams should shift their attention from code to specifications, how formal verification can check AI-generated implementations against those requirements, and why human judgment remains essential. Through a practical vault example, we show how this approach can uncover bugs that traditional code review and testing might miss.

Smart Contract Security
Sui’s object-centric architecture and Move’s type system introduce unique security considerations for developers. Drawing on Certora’s audits and formal verification work with Sui protocols, this article explores real findings involving object ownership, authorization, DeFi accounting, oracle handling, and cross-chain interactions, along with practical guidance for teams preparing for a security audit.

Smart Contract Security
This article examines five security gaps through real-world exploits involving Cetus, Aftermath Finance, Typus Finance, and Scallop. It also explores how developers can use testing and formal verification to check critical properties, detect vulnerabilities, and strengthen the security of Sui applications.

Formal Verification
AI-assisted formal verification can help smart contract teams reduce the cost and complexity of proving code correctness. This article explores how AI agents automate formal verification, how the approach differs from AI code review, and where human expertise remains essential.

Formal Verification
Formal verification can help DeFi teams catch issues earlier, while AI can make writing and checking specifications more accessible. Drawing on Certora’s work with Aave V4, we explore how developers can use LLMs alongside formal verification, why human judgment remains essential, and how protocols can better protect users when security assumptions fail.

Smart Contract Security
Moonwell checked its 20M MAMO supply cap on deposits only. The attacker deposited 15M MAMO, sent 53M more straight to the market, pumped the price and borrowed $11M. We gave AutoProver the code as it stood three days before the attack.

Formal Verification
A vulnerability in the Soroban SDK caused equivalent cryptographic values to compare as different, potentially allowing double withdrawals in affected contracts. This case study explores CVE-2026-32322, shows how Certora's Sunbeam Prover reproduces the issue with a simple formal verification rule, and explains what developers should check when using affected SDK versions.

Smart Contract Security
A practical look at Solana program security, from authorization and Token-2022 integrations to oracle checks and accounting invariants, illustrated by findings from Certora audits.

Smart Contract Security
A guide to auditing Daml smart contracts on Canton, from authorization and privacy to contract references, accounting invariants, settlement and topology.

Formal Verification
We examine four ways formally verified systems can fail: incorrect specifications, flawed assumptions, mismatches between verified models and deployed code, and bugs in verification tools themselves. Through real-world examples, we explain how to identify these risks and what to check before relying on a formal verification proof.

Smart Contract Security
On September 24, 2026, Payy lost $1.92 million in USDC after forged zero-knowledge proofs passed its verifier. This analysis reconstructs the Barretenberg soundness bug, the fix released 73 days before the exploit, and a Lean model demonstrating the missing constraint.

Smart Contract Security
Auditing Stellar smart contracts requires understanding both application logic and Soroban’s execution model. Drawing on Certora’s audit findings, this article examines authorization, storage lifetime, cross-contract calls, asset accounting, and cross-chain messaging. It shows how inconsistencies between components can strand transfers or prevent message execution, and explains which invariants teams should define before an audit.